Lubin v. Wackenhut: Decertification Order Based on Dukes Reversed by Cal. Ct. of Appeal
On November 21, 2016, the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District reversed the decertification of a class of over 10,000 employees. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court should examine the plaintiffs’ theory of recovery when evaluating class certification, rather than the frequency of violations resulting from that theory. Lubin v. The Wackenhut Corporation, No. B244383, __ Cal. App. 4th __ (2nd Dist. Div. 4 Nov. 21, 2016) (slip op. available here). This is welcome news for the plaintiffs’ class action bar, as it narrows the ways in which a trial court may peek at the merits of the plaintiff’s claims at the class certification stage.
The Lubin class of security officers, employed by Wackenhut, was initially certified for Labor Code claims on the basis of on-duty meal period waivers that the security officers had signed. Following certification, the parties agreed to a statistical sampling of records to determine the merits of the class claims—specifically, to determine how many class members had signed on-duty meal waivers that did not include required revocation language. Then, the United States Supreme Court issued its ruling on Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), in which the high court cast doubt on the acceptability of using statistical sampling to prove liability in an employment class action. The defendant in Lubin moved for decertification based on Dukes, on the grounds that the agreed-upon sampling of meal break waivers would violate Dukes’ proscription of “trial by formula.” The trial court took further briefing in light of Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004 (2012), and then decertified the class. The Lubin plaintiffs appealed.
The Court of Appeal, citing Brinker, held that the answer to the “ultimate question” for class certification “hinges on ‘whether the theory of recovery advanced by the proponents of certification is, as an analytical matter, likely to prove amenable to class treatment.’” Slip op. at 8 (internal citations omitted). In pushing against the trial court’s application of Dukes, the Court of Appeal pointed to the clarification in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1048 (2016) (stating that Dukes does not “stand for the broad proposition that a representative sample is an impermissible means of establishing classwide liability”). Slip op. at 12. Further, the Court of Appeal criticized the trial court for examining, in its class certification analysis, the damages issue of whether employees actually experienced meal period violations. Notably, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court’s “standard requiring plaintiffs to ‘conclusively establish’ that Wackenhut had a policy that violated wage and hour laws is improper because plaintiffs’ burden at class certification is to produce substantial evidence.” Id. at 41 (emphasis in original).
With Lubin, the impact of Dukes has been reduced, and class action plaintiffs in California can now more easily certify claims based on solid theories of liability, even if the actual impact of those theories does not necessarily result in widespread damages. However, defendants may see this as a dilution of what it means to have a certified class, given that the bar has, in a sense, been lowered.
Authored by:
Jonathan Lee, Associate
CAPSTONE LAW APC